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THE HEALTH SECURITY ACT: COERCION AND
DISTRUST FOR THE MARKET
H. Richard Beresfordt
At the center of current deliberations over health care reform are
debates about the proper role of government. Much of the contro-
versy focuses on the allocation of power among state and federal gov-
ernments and private actors. For example, some critics of the Clinton
Administration's Health Security Act (HSA),' the starter for today's
drive towards reform, have cast it as extravagant and intrusive "social-
ized medicine" that will erode the high quality of American health
care.
Less ideologically-driven criticisms rest on concerns that some
employers will shed workers if they are subject to a federal mandate to
fund employee heath benefits, 2 that reliance on a regulated market to
contain health care costs is misplaced,3 and that requiring universal
coverage will lead to a reduction in quality of care for many citizens.4
The scope and complexity of the regulatory bureaucracy the HSA con-
templates are also problematic, and the provision for federal price
controls in the form of contingent caps on health insurance premi-
ums is sure to attract determined opposition from health insurers and
those who have little faith in price controls as a solution to the prob-
lem of rising costs.
t BA. Yale, J.D. Harvard, M.D. University of Colorado. Visiting Professor of Law,
Cornell Law School. Adjunct Professor of Neurology, University of Rochester School of
Medicine and Dentistry.
1 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
2 SeeJacob A. Klerman & Dana P. Goldman,Job Loss Due to Health Insurance Mandates,
272JAMA 552, 555-56 (1994) (estimating, based on past responses by employers to mini-
mum wage legislation, that approximately 100,000 jobs would be lost due to the employer
mandate of the HSA.).
3 SeeJohn K. Iglehart, Managed Care, 327 NEw ENG. J. Mm. 742, 745 (1992) (citing
data casting doubt on cost-containing potential of managed care); Thomas Rice et al.,
Holes in the Jackson Hole Approach to Health Care Reform, 270 JAMA 1357, 1358-59 (1993)
(arguing that managed competition will not control heath care expenditures because
wealthy consumers will continue to buy insurance with rich benefits, enrollees in HMOs
will increase their utilization of services, and providers will continue to exercise their
strong bargaining powers).
4 See RobertJ. Blendon et al., Physician's Perspectives on Caring for Patients in the United
States, Canada, and West Germany, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1011, 1014-15 (1993) (data sug-
gesting that the trade-off citizens of Canada and West Germany incur for universal cover-
age is reduced access to advanced medical technology and a lower quality of some medical
services than in the United States).
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The critics of enlarging the governmental role in health care can-
not deny that the federal government is already a major player.
Under the Medicare statute,5 the federal government operates a
national single payer system for a burgeoning population of persons
over sixty-five and for many younger disabled persons.6 Through the
Medicaid program, it oversees and substantially funds efforts by state
and local governments to assure health care for millions of needy citi-
zens. 7 Additionally, the federal government directs and finances a
broad array of specialized prevention and treatment programs, gener-
ously supports the world's most productive biomedical research, and
heavily subsidizes undergraduate and graduate medical education. 8
Although popular enthusiasm for these programs varies, there is
no evident public outcry for eliminating or trimming them. More-
over, many state governments have increased their regulation of
health care providers and health insurers, and initiated a wide range
of programs aimed at controlling costs and improving access to care.9
Therefore, the question is not whether the government ought to play
a major role in the delivery and financing of health care: it is already
extensively involved at various levels and will remain so, apparently
with the public's blessing.
More pertinent are the narrower questions of whether the HSA's
elaborate strategies for involving government are necessary and, if
they are, whether methodologies for implementing these strategies
are framed so as to avoid debilitating legal and political challenges.
The gist of my answer to the first question is that less complex and
intrusive approaches than those of the HSA are preferable.
This is not because I believe that reform is unnecessary or unde-
sirable. Considerations of social justice, economics and politics un-
derscore the importance of addressing major shortcomings in our
system of health care. Too many people, including many of the most
vulnerable, lack health insurance or adequate access to medical care;
escalating costs impose heavy and sometimes unsustainable financial
5 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1988).
6 See John K. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Medicare, 327 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1467 (1992).
7 See John I. Iglehart, The American Health Care System: Medicaid, 328 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 896 (1993).
8 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 335-419
(1982) (describing the dramatic expansion of the role of federal government in regulating
and financing health care, medical education and biomedical research since World War
ii).
9 See Marilyn Moon & John Holahan, Can States Take the Lead in Health Care Reform,
268 JAMA 468 (1992); John K. Iglehart, Health Care Reform: The States, 330 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 75 (1993).
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burdens on public and private payers; and there is a pervasive sense of
insecurity about the reliability of existing health insurance coverage.' 0
In this Article, I delineate major elements of the HSA in order to
critique what I see as its most troubling features. I then offer a less
elaborate approach that preserves a stronger role for nonfederal ac-
tors in the sensitive, complicated task of achieving a decent level of
health care for all the public. I argue that the HSA is unduly coercive
and distrustful of the market forces it purports to unleash. Although I
concede that new regulatory efforts and subsidies are needed, I pro-
pose a version of "managed competition"" that emphasizes assuring
universal access to health insurance, attacks some of the current sys-
tem's more egregious abuses and perverse incentives, and forthrightly
recognizes that a more just system of health care will require wide-
spread sharing of the necessary added costs.
This alternative version would hardly be painless. However, I be-
lieve it would be less onerous than the HSA and its variants, leaving
largely intact a system that, for all its imperfections, delivers techni-
cally excellent care, is capable of nuanced allocative decisions, and
responds quickly to calls for scientific and technical innovation.
I
THE HEALTH SEcURITY Acr
A. Central Features of the HSA
The HSA is grand in design. It seeks to remedy fundamental
shortcomings of the American health care system: the millions who
lack health insurance, the insecurity of benefits for those who are in-
sured, and escalating costs that neither regulation nor market forces
have much dampened. The HSA's dominant strategy is to recast the
medical marketplace to assure that members of the public have the
10 Lack of health insurance may cause more than financial problems. Recent empiri-
cal studies demonstrate a direct correlation between lack of adequate health insurance and
mortality and morbidity. See Peter Franks et al., Health Insurance and Mortality: Evidence from
a National Cohort 270JAMA 737 (1993) (empirical study revealing that lack of health insur-
ance associated with increased mortality in all sociodemographic groups examined); Helen
R Burstin et al., Socioeconomic Status and Risk for Substandard Medical Care, 268 JAMA 2383
(1992). See generally Troyen A. Brennan, An Ethical Perspective on Health Care Insurance Re-
form, 19 Am. J.L. & MED. 38 (1993) (proposing that "ethical" health care reform would
provide universal coverage, would assure the same broad benefits for everyone, would not
commit to either competitive or single payer modes of financing, would assure informed
consent in managed care, would segregate ethics of medical care to individual patients
from ethics of health care delivery to populations, and would contemplate limits on provid-
ers' incomes).
11 See generally Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, 12
HEALTH AsF. 23 (Supp. 1993) (defining managed competition and supporting the proposi-
tion that managed competition is workable);John K. Iglehart, Health Policy Report: Managed
Competition, 328 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1208 (1993) (explaining principles of managed
competition).
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power to bargain effectively with insurers and providers over prices for
services.
To implement this strategy, the HSA offers a mix of coercion,
regulation, and constraints on pricing. It requires that everyone buy
health insurance,1 2 that health plans provide comprehensive bene-
fits,' 3 and that employers pay a heavy share of health insurance
costs. 14 It would reshape the medical workforce to limit new entrants
and produce more general practitioners and fewer specialists. 15 Cost
containment would flow from a more competitive market, administra-
tive efficiencies, 16 attacks on fraud and abuse,17 and reform of mal-
practice laws.' 8 If market forces fail to control costs, caps on health
insurance premiums would be imposed to induce payers to force prov-
iders to lower prices.' 9 Funding for subsidies needed to assure univer-
sal coverage would come from a tax on tobacco products and savings
from the operation of Medicare.20
Beyond these core elements, the HSA addresses several other as-
pects of American health care. Although some of these are of great
interest, the focus of discussion here will be on the methods for attain-
ing and financing universal coverage.
B. Attaining Universal Coverage
1. Mandatory Enrollment in Alliances
The HSA requires states to establish one or more regional alli-
ances that all must join.21 The alliances may be state agencies, non-
profit corporations, or entities that contract with state agencies and
are subject to regulations by states under standards provided in the
HSA.22 Directors of the regional alliances must include representa-
tives of the employers required to buy health insurance for employees
who have enrolled in the alliances. 23 Corporations with more than
5000 employees have the option to form their own corporate alli-
ances,24 enabling them to continue their own self-insurance programs
subject to constraints applicable to the regional alliances.
12 H.1R 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1002 (1993).
13 Id. §§ 1101(a), 1111-1123.
14 Id. § 6122.
15 Id. § 3012.
16 Id. § 1410.
17 Id. §§ 5432-5441.
18 Id. §§ 5301-5310.
19 Id. § 6011.
20 Id. §7111.
21 Id. § 1002(a).
22 Id. § 1301.
23 Id. § 1301(b).
24 Id. § 1311.
1408 [Vol. 79:1405
HeinOnline -- 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1408 1993-1994
COERCION AND DISTRUST
The regional alliances must negotiate contracts with state-ap-
proved health plans to provide health services for their enrollees.2 5
These contracts must provide comprehensive benefits and a menu of
options for enrollees, 26 including at least one "fee for service" op-
tion.27 Part of the negotiation with health plans would be to establish
premiums payable under the various options. Alliances, however,
could refuse to negotiate with any health plan whose proposed pre-
mium exceeds 120 percent of the weighted average of premiums pro-
posed by all other health plans in the alliance. 28 Once alliances
complete their negotiations with health plans, they must determine
and publish the premiums to be charged enrollees or their employ-
ers.29 Enrollees would then elect a particular contract under which
they or their employers would be responsible for payment of
premiums.
After enrollees have chosen an insurance contract, alliances
would collect the premiums and distribute them to the health plans
on an adjusted per capita basis.30 The adjustments would take into
account differences in insurance risk profiles among enrollees in dif-
ferent plans, recognizing that some plans might, for example, have a
disproportionately large number of high risk enrollees such as elders
and HIV-positive persons. Premium distributions to health plans
would be subject to set asides for administrative costs and a 1.5 per-
cent subsidy to academic medical centers for graduate medical educa-
tion in programs approved under the workforce provisions of the
HSA.31
2. Guaranteed Issue by Health Plans
To secure the state approval specified by the HSA and to qualify
for bargaining with alliances, health plans must agree to offer compre-
hensive benefits and to accept important constraints on how they op-
erate.3 2 They must, for example, forego actuarial underwriting
("experience rating"); cover persons with preexisting medical condi-
tions; eschew use of waiting periods before coverage becomes effective
and the practice of canceling coverage after large claims are made;
and utilize community rating in calculating premiums.33
25 Id. § 1321.
26 I& § 1322(a).
27 Id § 1322(b) (1).
28 Id. § 1321 (b) (1).
29 Id. §§ 1342-1344.
30 I& § 1351.
31 Id. §§ 1351-1353, 3031-3032.
32 Id. §§ 1402-1403.
33 Id.
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These constraints would not only force health insurers to issue
contracts to applicants whom they once rejected or abandoned as pro-
hibitive actuarial risks; they would also compel insurers to equalize
premiums among all their insureds. For younger persons and other
low-risk enrollees who can now obtain relatively low cost coverage in
the small group or individual health insurance markets, the result
could be a substantial increase in health insurance costs.
Health plans that are part of an employer's self-insurance pro-
gram would be subject to the same constraints as insurer-operated
plans.34 Large self-insuring employers could, however, soften the im-
pact of a community rating methodology for setting premiums by cre-
ating large risk pools and by implementing hiring policies that
account for health insurance risks posed by potential employees. Se-
lective hiring policies are of course limited to the extent that employ-
ers can lawfully discern these risks without violating antidiscrimination
laws.
Health care providers that form entities coupling delivery of serv-
ices with prepayment or other insurance-like mechanisms are bound
by the same constraints as health plans formed by insurers. Finally, all
plans that issue health insurance contracts must, in order to promote
financial stability, competence, and fair administration, meet speci-
fied capital and solvency requirements, verify credentialing of provid-
ers, monitor quality of care, and provide mechanisms for resolving
disputes among providers and plan enrollees.35
3. Defined Benefits
The HSA specifies a benefit package that is truly comprehensive.
It provides coverage for physician and hospital care, preventive serv-
ices, mental health and substance abuse services, family planning, hos-
pice and home health care, prescription drugs, and outpatient
diagnostic testing and rehabilitation services.3 6 It also covers durable
medical equipment and devices, vision and dental care, and investiga-
tional treatments that are part of an approved research protocol.37
Coverage is subject to cost-sharing requirements and other
adjustments.3 8
The oversight body created by the HSA, the National Health
Board,39 is empowered to expand the benefit package to the extent
expansion would not cause a regional alliance to exceed its per capita
34 Id.
35 Id. § 1410.
36 Id. §§ 1101(a), 1111-1123.
37 Id. §§ 1101(a), 1124-1128.
38 Id. §§ 1342-1344.
39 Id. § 1151.
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premium target4° and to specify the preventive services to be cov-
ered.41 The Board is also responsible for writing regulations that set
standards for determining when ostensibly covered services are "medi-
cally necessary or appropriate." 42 Services that fail this test are not
reimbursable, and providers are barred from seeking payment for
such excluded services from health plans or enrollees.
4. Sources of Payment for Universal Coverage
Accurately projecting the costs of achieving universal coverage is
a daunting task. Nevertheless, it is obvious these costs will be large
and that additional public expenditures will be necessary. Added pub-
lic burdens may be direct and easily appreciated, such as sharp in-
creases in income or sales taxes, or indirect and obfuscated, such as
cost shifting from private third-party payers to public payers. Cost-
shifting will in turn cause widespread inflation in private insurance
premiums, higher costs of goods and services when sellers pass on
their higher health care costs, and selective manipulations of income
tax rules. The HSA offers a mix of direct and indirect burdens, em-
phasizing the indirect.
a. Employer Mandate
The HSA would require most employers to pay about eighty per-
cent of the costs of health insurance coverage for employees and their
families.43 For all but the smallest employers, an employer's obliga-
tion would be capped at 7.9 percent of adjusted payroll.44 For em-
ployers with fewer than seventy-five full-time employees the cap could
be as low as 3.5 percent of adjusted payroll.45
b. Self-Employed Individuals
Self-employed enrollees would pay for their own health insur-
ance, as would unemployed enrollees who do not qualify for federal
programs or subsidies. However, they would be entitled to deduct
from gross taxable income the cost of premiums paid to purchase the
comprehensive benefits package specified in the HSA, capped at a
sum equal to their earned income. 45
40 Id. § 1152.
41 I& § 1153.
42 Id. § 1154.
43 Id. § 6122.
44 Id. § 6123(b) (2).
46 Id. § 7203.
1994] 1411
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c. Public Funds
The HSA would impose an additional federal excise tax on to-
bacco 47 and a one percent annual payroll tax on large employers
electing to form corporate alliances. 48 After the year 2004, the value
of employer-paid premiums for health insurance coverage beyond
that of the comprehensive benefit package would be includible in an
employee's gross taxable income. 49 Employer contributions towards
the comprehensive benefit package would remain tax free.
C. Lowering Health Care Costs
1. Managed Competition
The policy choice of the HSA is to retain private health insurance
as the predominant payment mechanism and to rely heavily on a re-
structured, intensely competitive medical marketplace to achieve the
economies needed to sustain universal coverage. The components of
this new medical market are the alliances as informed buyers, the vari-
ous providers of health services and products as sellers, and the regu-
lated health plans as intermediaries between the alliances and the
providers. While the HSA does not formally require physicians and
hospitals to band together to negotiate with purchasing alliances, an-
ticipation of the HSA or something like it has apparently fueled move-
ment towards integration or joint ventures among providers as a way
to maximize bargaining power.5 0 The new domain is thus one that
emphasizes large size and great efficiency.
In keeping with this shift to what Professor Blumstein describes as
a countervailing power model of health market economics,5 ' the HSA
contains provisions designed to maximize the ability of some major
players-but not physicians-to exercise economic power. One such
provision is a broad preemption of state laws that inhibit certain cost-
containing practices of HMOs and health insurers that rely on reim-
bursement methodologies other than fee-for-service. Among the pre-
empted laws are those that require health plans to accept all willing
providers, that limit the power of plans to require use of designated
providers in nonemergency situations, that prevent plans from limit-
ing access to nonparticipating providers, that bar creating incentives
47 Id. § 7111.
48 Id. § 7121(a).
49 Id. § 7201(b).
50 See Kevin E. Grady, A Framework for Antitrust Analysis of Health Care Joint Ventures, 61
ANTrrRusT LAwJ. 765, 766-67 (1993) (describing recent tendencies of medical providers to
form joint ventures to achieve efficiencies in health care delivery).
51 SeeJames F. Blumstein, Health Care Reform: The Policy Context, 29 WAKE FoREST L.
Rxv. 15, 28-29 (1994).
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to using participating providers, and that bar corporations from con-
ducting medical practice.52
The obvious rationale for this preemption is to remove impedi-
ments that states have erected to some of the more aggressive strate-
gies which HMOs and third party payers have employed in their
efforts to contain health care costs. Although the preempted laws may
represent public concerns about the adverse effects on the quality of
care resulting from certain cost-containing strategies, the HSA draft-
ers may have concluded that regulatory constraints on health plans
and the professionalism of most providers furnish adequate
counterweights to overly crass attempts at cost containment. On the
other hand, they may simply have discounted the possibility that the
preempted laws could have any positive impact on the quality of
health care.
The HSA would also remove the umbrella protection from anti-
trust prosecution that the McCarran-Ferguson Act53 affords for actions
by health insurers that are part of the business of insurance. 54 The
HSA thus increases the risk of antitrust prosecutions for certain ac-
tions by health insurers that were once immune, such as coerced dis-
counts by insurers with substantial market power.55
On the other hand, the HSA contains a provision that would re-
tain federal antitrust immunity for negotiations between providers
and alliances that culminate in a fee scale,56 effectively incorporating
a version of "state action" immunity for these negotiations. 57 It would,
however, bar providers from threatening or engaging in a boycott as
part of the process, 58 thereby limiting their ability to exercise whatever
market power they possess with respect to monolithic regional
alliances.
2. Targeted Cost Containment Measures
Alongside the cost-restraining pressures of an efficient market,
the HSA would attack certain problems that contribute to the escalat-
ing costs of health care.
52 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1407 (1993).
53 McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988)).
54 See, e.g., Health Care Equalization Comm. v. Iowa Medical Soc'y, 851 F.2d 1020 (8th
Cir. 1988) (construing McCarran-Ferguson Act to immunize conduct in business of insur-
ance from antitrust scrutiny). Cf. H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 5501 (1993) (repeal-
ing McCarran-Ferguson exemption).
55 See, e.g., Group Life and Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
56 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1322(c)(5) (1993).
57 See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94 (1988).
58 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1322(c)(6) (1993).
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a. Fraud and Abuse
The HSA would amend federal criminal laws to include a new
offense of health care fraud,59 and would provide for expanded en-
forcement and penalties under existing laws against fraud and abuse
(including self-referrals by medical providers).60
b. Workforce Reform
Although the HSA would continue a federal subsidy for graduate
medical education, 6' it would form a national council on graduate
medical education to oversee and administer the subsidy.62 The coun-
cil would ensure that the total number of training slots approved for
funding each year would bear a relationship to the number of United
States medical graduates in the preceding year.63 The council would
also be required to ensure that by the year 2002 no fewer than fifty-
five percent of medical graduates enter graduate training programs in
primary care. The fiscal goal of these provisions is to contain those
portions of rising health care costs attributed to a perceived glut of
physicians and to overutilization of the services of specialists and
subspecialists.
c. Malpractice reform
The HSA includes several provisions designed to reduce medical
liability costs. 64 These provisions would preempt any conflicting state
laws except those that afford stronger defenses to providers or greater
cost-reducing potential than those of the HSA.65 Included in the HSA
reforms are mandatory use of alternative dispute resolution prior to
filing suit,66 mandatory inclusion of a certificate of merit in any filing
of a malpractice suit,67 limitations on contingency fees, 68 a collateral
payment offset,69 and provision for periodic payment of damage
awards.70 One assumption that seems to underlie these reforms is that
medical liability costs, including those attributable to "defensive
medicine," are significant contributors to the overall escalation in
health care costs.
59 Id. § 5431.
60 Id. §§ 5432-5441.
61 Id. § 3031.
62 Id. § 3001.
63 Id. § 3012(d)(3)(A).
64 Id. §§ 5301-5310.
65 Id. § 5301(a) (2).
66 Id. § 5302.
67 Id. § 5303.
68 Id. § 5304.
69 Id. § 5305.
70 Id. § 5306.
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3. Price Controls
Under the HSA, the national health board is required to deter-
mine a regional alliance inflation factor, a general health care infla-
tion factor (limited to the Consumer Price Index after 1998), and a
national per capita baseline premium target derived from current na-
tional average per capita expenditures on covered services and ad-
justed for inflation.71 If regional alliance health plans exceed their
per capita targets in any given year, the premiums payable in the suc-
ceeding year are reduced proportionally to the excess.72 The predict-
able downstream effect of this would be to force providers under the
health plans to accept reduced prices for their services.
II
CRITIQUE OF THE HSA
A. The HSA in Context
If the drafters of the HSA believed they were beginning with a
blank slate, they had options ranging from a federalized single payer
system to a totally deregulated health care market. However, political
realities apparently intruded early.
The conceptually simplest plan, a national single payer plan, was
promptly rejected. This was true despite its potential for quick
achievement of universal coverage, large savings in administrative
costs, and preservation of existing relationships between patients and
providers.73 An explicit federal takeover of health care financing and
the attendant need for broad-based tax increases to fund the new pro-
gram are features that may have made the single-payer option seem
politically untenable. Ironically, the HSA would permit states to cre-
ate their own single payer plans, either statewide or on a regional ba-
sis.7 4 Its designers may thus have concluded that the political climate
in at least some places is conducive to a government-run program.
At the opposite pole from a single payer plan is a plan that
removes much of the existing regulation of health care delivery, re-
taining some sort of public safety net for the uninsurable and those
who incur medical catastrophes. Such a plan would abolish laws that
permit governments to regulate prices charged by providers and in-
71 Id. §§ 6001-6002.
72 Id. § 6011.
73 See, e.g., David U. Himmelstein et al., A National Health Program for the United States,
320 NEw ENG. J. MED. 102, 106-110 (1989) (argument for Canadian style single payer sys-
tem with a single set of benefits); Steffie Woolhandler & David U. Himmelstein, The Deterio-
rating Administrative Efficienty of the U.S. Health Care System, 324 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1253,
1256-57 (1991) (demonstrating the high administrative costs of the United States' health
care system as compared to those in Canada).
74 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 1221 (1993).
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surers, laws that restrict health insurers' ability to utilize actuarial un-
derwriting, and laws that limit capital expenditures by hospitals or
other corporate providers. To remove incentives to overutilize health
care, such a deregulatory plan might also remove the tax preference
for employment-based health insurance benefits. The safety net could
be a tax-funded program such as Medicaid or a redesigned Medicare.
A deregulatory plan might improve marketplace efficiency
though reduced regulatory costs and better matching of health insur-
ance costs to rationally determined needs for medical services. But it
would rather overtly create a dual-track system of health care, one for
those with means to purchase adequate health insurance and one for
those relegated to marginally funded public programs in which qual-
ity of care may be suspect.75 The perceived inequity of such a system
could evoke enough opposition to derail an overt move to deregulate,
even though the American public has long tolerated huge numbers of
medically uninsured persons and differential access to health care
services based on ability to pay.
B. Coercive Dimensions of the HSA
The HSA would refashion the health care market through regula-
tion so that virtually everyone would become entitled to private health
insurance. This approach is coercive in several respects.
The HSA would force everyone to buy insurance through large
alliances that could only negotiate with health plans that meet strin-
gent regulatory requirements. It would compel employers to pay most
of the costs of insurance for employees and their families. It would
compel insurers to cover persons they would otherwise exclude ac-
cording to traditional actuarial principles. By virtue of the default
power to control premiums payable to health plans, the HSA would
bar insurers and providers from charging prices they could ordinarily
command in a competitive market, even if their services are of excep-
tional quality. The workforce provisions would enable regulators to
constrain both the number of physicians entering the market and
their choice of activity in that market.
What would remain after enactment of the HSA would be a "mar-
ket" in which corporate purchasers bargain with corporate sellers
under ground rules that specify what products sellers can offer and
that limit the prices they can charge. The actual providers of most of
the services, physicians and hospitals, can obtain effective entry into
the bargaining process only by banding together into entities large
enough to capture the attention of alliances and health plans. Bar-
75 See Katherine L. Kahn et al., Health Care for Black and Poor Hospitalized Medicare Pa-
tients, 271 JAMA 1169 (1994) (poor and minority patients received lower quality of care
than other patients despite Medicare coverage).
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gaining will occur only in the shadow of price controls, amended fed-
eral antitrust laws that limit exercises of whatever market power
physicians collectively possess, and bureaucratic controls on the
number of new physician entrants into either the broad market or the
limited markets for specialty services. This would be indeed a strange
marketplace.
C. Illusory Commitment to Competition
1. Contrived Bargaining
The ideal of "managed competition" is that informed and em-
powered buyers of health insurance and services can lever competitive
insurers and providers into offering cost-efficient products. In this
paradigm, neither purchasers nor sellers should have enough eco-
nomic power to force unreasonably high or low prices on the other
through either monopoly or monopsony.
To protect against an imbalance of power, the HSA attempts
through regulation to allocate appropriate amounts of economic
power to buyers and sellers so that appropriate prices will emerge.
Whether the allocations of the HSA are rational in an economic sense
is far beyond my competence to assess. But I am profoundly skeptical
about the assumption that legislators or regulators can determine in
advance what is the proper amount of power economic actors should
have to arrive at socially desirable pricing of health services. It is hard
enough to make such judgments retrospectively when large amounts
of empirical and other data are available.
2. Hiding True Costs
From a political perspective, major health care reform is a hard
sell. A commanding majority of the public have health insurance, and
most of them are apparently satisfied with the quality of health care
they receive. However, fears about loss of health insurance and rising
out-of-pocket payments for health care are realistic concerns for many
who are insured,76 and there is apparently broad support for the idea
of universal, noncancellable coverage.'" When it comes to paying for
76 See RobertJ. Blendon et al., Paying Medical Bills in the United States, 271 JAMA 949,
950-51 (1994) (survey of 1897 households revealing that three of four Americans with
health insurance have problems paying medical bills, that worries about costs of medical
care coincide with concerns about job loss, and that these worries strike those who are
most vulnerable).
77 See RobertJ. Blendon et al., Bridging the Gap Between Expert and Public Views on Health
Care Reform, 269 JAMA 2573, 2574 (1993) (as a health system reform strategy, the public
overwhelmingly prefers universal health insurance coverage to attempts to control medical
costs); Lawrence R.Jacobs, Health Reform Impasse: The Politics of American Ambivalence Toward
Government 18J. HEALTH POL., PoL'y & L. 629, 631-37 (1993) (summarizing opinion poll
data indicating public support for universal health insurance coverage); Mark Schlesinger
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universal coverage, there is little public support for tax increases but
more enthusiasm for employment-based insurance in which employ-
ers pay most or all of the costs. 78 In this context, the HSA heeds the
public mood with its call for universal coverage, narrowly targeted
taxes, and a mandate to employers to pay most of the incremental
costs.
Despite these perceived benefits, it makes no sense to suggest
that an employer mandate somehow allows the public to avoid paying
for universal coverage. If they can, employers will pass on their raised
insurance costs to the public in the form of higher prices. If they
cannot, they are likely to reduce wages and salaries of their employees
or reduce their workforce by firing or limiting hiring.
In these ways, costs of reform are shifted to the public, albeit un-
evenly and often unrecognizably. Nevertheless, the financial impact is
equivalent to a tax. Much of the public may not recognize this effect
or, if they do, may find it less objectionable than a higher tax bill that
is directly traceable to health care reform. Yet to the extent that the
HSA plays into the illusion that an employer mandate allows employ-
ees (and therefore the bulk of the United States population) to avoid
paying for universal coverage, it may dampen the incentives of em-
ployees to make prudent choices about consuming health care and
run counter to other measures designed to promote cost
containment.
3. Perverse Tax Incentives
In addition to requiring employers to pay for employees' health
insurance the HSA would allow employees to exclude from taxable
income employer payments for the comprehensive benefits pack-
age.79 The negative effects of this exclusion on federal tax revenues
are obvious and quite considerable.8 0
Even more controversial is the impact of favorable tax treatment
of health benefits on consumption of health care. Some commenta-
tors argue that the exclusion encourages covered employees to seek
marginally useful or unnecessary care.81 Moreover, even if care meets
& Tae-ku Lee, Is Health Care Different? Popular Support of Federal Health and Social Policies, 18
J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y AND L. 551, 557-78 (1993) (data from regression analyses suggest
growing public support for federal intervention in health care relative, to other social
programs).
78 Blendon et al., supra note 77, at 2575-76.
79 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. § 7201 (1993).
80 See M. Susan Marquis &Joan L. Buchanan, How Will Changes in Health Insurance Tax
Policy and Employer Health Plan Contributions Affect Access to Health Care and Health Care Costs,
271 JAMA 939, 944 (1994) (economic simulation indicating that removal of tax subsidy for
employer paid premiums would have small impact on total health spending but raise an-
nual tax revenues by $35.6 billion).
81 See Blumstein, supra note 51, at 21-25.
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a lax standard of medical necessity, employees who are taxed on the
value of employer-provided health benefits might forego care that
translates into higher costs for their employer and a higher valuation
of their taxable health benefits.82
Undoubtedly, the utility of some care that individuals purchase is
negligible. But whether the availability of health insurance actually
influences an individual's decision to seek such care is hard to mea-
sure. Indeed, empirical studies involving Medicare beneficiaries have
revealed wide geographic variations in expenditures for comparable
medical services, 83 suggesting a lack of consensus among physicians
and patients about how much care is appropriate even when patients
are insured. The decision may be influenced by factors other than the
availability of insurance. For example, visiting a physician or hospital
may be an uncomfortable, unpleasant experience, no matter who pays
the bill, and in this sense may never be cost free. On the other hand,
once care is initiated there is some evidence that decisions about how
much care to consume are influenced by what insurance is available.8 4
Regardless of the effect of health insurance on consumption deci-
sions, the choice to perpetuate tax breaks for employer-paid insurance
seems primarily political in character. Inclusion of the value of health
insurance benefits in taxable income would be widely and accurately
perceived as a dreaded tax, as would removing deductibility of health
insurance premiums paid by the self-employed. It might matter little
to the public that resultant increases in federal tax collections might
be enough to largely fund subsidies for the needy uninsured and un-
derinsured. 85 Nevertheless, the decision by architects of the HSA to
retain the tax preference for employee health benefits further displays
the highly provisional quality of their commitment to market forces as
a vehicle for driving down consumption of marginally useful services.
4. Workforce Controls
The HSA would limit both the total number of training slots avail-
able for medical graduates and the number of opportunities for train-
ing in medical specialties.86 The rationale is that an excess of
physicians, and especially an excess of specialists, fuels inflation in
82 Id.
83 See W. Pete Welch et al., Geographic Variation in Expenditures for Physicians' Services in
the United States, 328 NEw ENG.J. MED. 621 (1993).
84 See Willard G. Manning, Health Insurance and the Demand for Medical Car 77 AM.
ECON. REv. 251, 252 (1986) (evidence that first dollar health insurance coverage increased
utilization of health services).
85 See Marquis & Buchanan, supra note 80.
86 H.R. 3600, 103d Cong. 1st Sess. §§ 3012-3013 (1993).
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health care costs. 8 7 It is further assumed that physicians can create
markets for their services, some of which are unnecessary, and that
specialists in particular cause excessive consumption of medical serv-
ices because of their tendency to order high-cost diagnostic or thera-
peutic measures. 88
While there are empirical data to support these assumptions,8 9
there is no generally accepted approach to forecasting how many phy-
sicians will be needed at any given time.9° Moreover, the notion that
reducing the number of physicians or specialists will in itself affect
total health care costs may be only wishful thinking. A smaller
number of physicians may increase the volume of reimbursable serv-
ices they provide, and continuing advances in medical technology will
assure that ever more costly-and effective-diagnostic and therapeu-
tic modalities will be available to physicians9' regardless of their
shrinking number. Thus, a "top down" attempt to control and redis-
tribute the physician workforce, with the additional regulatory effort
this would entail and its potentially demoralizing effects on new physi-
cians and medical students, is at best problematic. To avoid this sort
of regulatory solution, medical educators have recently shown in-
creased interest in proposals to redress the existing imbalance be-
tween specialists and primary care physicians. 92
The idea that reducing the supply of physicians will contain
health care costs in a competitive market is counterintuitive. Health
plans ought to have greater bargaining power to secure favorable
prices for physician services if numerous physicians are competing for
contracts with them. If the number of new physicians entering a par-
ticular market for primary care or specialty services declines, the re-
maining physicians will be positioned to command higher prices from
health plans than if they were facing competition from new market
entrants. Moreover, if managed competition works as it is supposed
to, new entrants would be unable to create a demand for "unneces-
sary" or overpriced services. Health plans would presumably negotiate
87 See Anne Schwartz et al., Reforming Graduate Medical Education, 270 JAMA 1079
(1998).
88 See generally Physician Payment Reform Commission, Annual Report to Congress,
Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) No. 694, extra ed. (Apr. 23, 1992) (expressing view
that the dominance of specialists in the U.S. health care system is an important cause of
escalating costs because of their reliance on expensive technology).
89 Id.
90 See Elizabeth C. Feil et al., WMy Estimates of Physician Supply and Requirements Disagree,
269JAMA 2659, 2663 (1993) (describing absence of accepted approach to forecasting phy-
sician requirements and wide discrepancies in forecasts).
91 See Eli Ginzburg, High-Tech Medicine and Rising Health Care Costs, 263 JAMA 1820
(1990).
92 See John K. Iglehart, Health Care Reform and Graduate Medical Education, 330 NEw
ENG.J. MED. 1167, 1169-70 (1994).
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only for those services its subscribers need and that are cost effective.
Physicians trying to offer marginally useful or overly costly services
would therefore be unlikely to secure contracts with the health plans.
In this context, a flood of new physicians would not generate higher
health care costs in a particular region unless health plans determined
their services were needed.
D. The Threat to Medical Professionalism
1. Loss of Autonomy
The HSA does not purport to regulate physicians with respect to
fees or modes of practice. Physicians would, in theory, remain free to
choose which health plans to join, which patients to serve, and where
and how to practice. The reality is, however, that the HSA would re-
duce their freedom in these respects. All potential patients would be
enrolled in approved health plans, and the plans would exert consid-
erable control over the flow of patients. To gain access to these pa-
tients, physicians would be forced to contract with health plans
directly or to join networks with other providers as a way capturing
patients from insurer-controlled plans or HMOs. Once physicians
contract with a plan or join a network, they are bound by its fee struc-
ture and become subject to the credentialing and monitoring the
HSA requires all health plans to implement. A few specialists whose
services are in great demand or who enjoy a sort of "natural monop-
oly"93 may retain a measure of autonomy for a time, but their number
would probably shrink as health plans expanded.
The diminished autonomy for physicians that the HSA envisions
would not necessarily erode the quality of care they offer. Quality-
oriented oversight activities of health plans might counter the demor-
alization that could otherwise lead to substandard care. More effi-
cient referrals under a managed care model might allow physicians to
make better use of their time with patients. Nevertheless, some-per-
haps many-physicians could find that a combination of
micromanagement by lay administrators of health plans and cost-
driven pressures to process patients so alters their personal relation-
ships with patients as to affect the quality of care they provide.
2. Loss of Bargaining Power
In the new market of the HSA, physicians would suffer a marked
reduction in their power to set prices for their services. The most
93 See generally Richard Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV.
548 (1969) (describing how natural monopoly may arise when the entire demand in a
relevant market can be satisfied at lowest cost by a single firm that possesses particular
technology or resources).
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important bargaining would be between alliances and health plans
over premiums. Physicians' prices for their services would largely turn
on the outcome of these negotiations. An exception would exist
where physicians control the health plans, but few physicians are likely
to find themselves in this position.
This disempowerment of physicians may be just what the archi-
tects of the HSA intended. Physicians as a group have high incomes,
the rate of increase in their income has historically exceeded the gen-
eral rate of inflation, and traditional fee-for-service medicine has been
viewed as a major contributor to high health care costs. Reducing
physicians' power to set prices by interposing regulated alliances and
health plans might therefore be seen as ajust way of containing health
care costs.
The problem for patients, however, may be that the exclusion of
physicians from a central price-setting role may result in excessive con-
centration on costs by nonphysician administrators and insufficient at-
tention to providing the resources needed to deliver the sort of care
patients in the United States have come to expect. How big a prob-
lem this might become is impossible to know, but it would seem to be
a legitimate concern in an environment where physicians play a lim-
ited role in decisions about allocation of medical resources.
III
TowARD ADEQUATE REFORM: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE HSA
A. Extent of Consensus on Reform
There is an apparent public consensus that some health care re-
form is needed,94 and there is no dearth of ideas about how to accom-
plish it. But uncertainty surrounds the durability of the consensus
and the ability of Congress to produce a plan that will substantially
remedy agreed upon problems of inadequate access and high costs.
The HSA is a pastiche of regulation and market-oriented meas-
ures that, in one way or another, addresses these problems. Given
wise and dedicated regulators, compliant medical providers, and a
firm societal commitment to distributive justice, including tolerance
for higher public expenditures, the NSA could perhaps achieve its
goals. But because I doubt that these elements are now in place or
soon realizable, it seems appropriate to consider a less elaborate ap-
proach than that of the ISA.
One alternative, of course, is to abandon the struggle for major
legislative changes, take solace that American medicine well meets the
needs of most citizens, and continue nibbling at the edges of the
problems of the uninsured and of others whose access to urgently
94 See Blendon et aL, supra notes 76-77.
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needed care is limited or who face grave financial hardships because
of ill health. Because I find this alternative too grim to contemplate
and agree that expanded coverage and better cost containment are
important social goals, I will suggest elements of an approach that is
less coercive and more faithful to a market model of health care than
the HSA, and that does not evade the issue of the need for all who can
to share the costs of reform.
B. Elements of Adequate Reform
1. Assured Access to Private Health Insurance
To approximate the ideal of universal coverage in a polity that
has apparently rejected a national single payer system, everyone must
have an opportunity to obtain private health insurance. This necessar-
ily includes those in poor health, those who cannot afford to pay for
insurance, and those incapable of recognizing the value of insurance,
such as children and the legally incompetent.
The solution of the HSA is to compel everyone to join alliances,
to compel most employers to pay most of the costs of insurance for
employees and their families, to offer tax benefits to the self-em-
ployed, and to provide means-tested subsidies for those who cannot
buy health insurance. The HSA would thus provide coverage for
everyone, making employers pay a large portion of the added costs.
While this approach builds upon an existing tradition of tax favored,
employment-based insurance and is a convenient way of adding many
currently uninsured persons to health insurance rolls, it is very coer-
cive and perpetuates the notion that obtaining, paying for, and utiliz-
ing health insurance is the responsibility of someone else.
A less burdensome and more nearly market-oriented approach
would guarantee health insurance to all who apply, regardless of
health, and establish mechanisms to facilitate application for insur-
ance and to assist those who need help in paying premiums. Califor-
nia, for example, has enacted legislation that enables employees of
small businesses and their families, other uninsured employees and
families, and persons who represent high actuarial risks for health in-
surers to join purchasing cooperatives that must take all comers. 95
Like the regional alliances under the HSA, the cooperatives can nego-
tiate discounted benefits for their members in prepaid or fee-for-ser-
vice health plans. But unlike the alliances of the HSA, these
cooperatives have no significant regulatory powers with respect to
health plans. The health plans themselves have considerable flexibil-
95 See Michelle Quinn, California's Health PooL Limits, but Lower Rates, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
11, 1994, at Al.
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ity as to how they structure delivery of services, so long as they offer
statutorily defined core benefits.
An alternative to assured access to purchasing cooperatives is en-
rollment in existing or expanded government-sponsored health bene-
fit programs. Eligible individuals could thus enroll in Medicare or the
Federal Employee Health Benefits Program. In these programs, en-
rollees would share costs of insurance to the extent of their financial
ability and could qualify for subsidized premiums on proof of finan-
cial need. Also, eligible persons could be given access to statewide or
regional risk pools or reinsurance programs in which purchase of cov-
erage is partially or fully subsidized through broadly based state taxes,
premium taxes or assessments on private health insurers.96 Needed
subsidies in these programs could take the form of direct governmen-
tal payments to health insurers, tax credits, or credit cards dedicated
for use in buying health insurance. Those with the means to supple-
ment their coverage beyond the core benefit package could purchase
additional coverage or receive it as a taxable employment benefit.
There is an obvious risk that these noncoercive alternatives to the
HSA might leave an appreciable number of persons uninsured. Some
persons may be unwilling to expend any money to buy health insur-
ance and will bypass the opportunity to obtain coverage. Others, be-
cause of inertia, poor judgment, or mental incapacity, may fail to
acquire coverage, even though there is a clear need for it. If the pool
of nonparticipants becomes too large, costs of their care would be un-
systematically shifted to those who pay for their insurance, as is now
the case. Among other consequences, this inefficient allocation of
medical resources could greatly complicate efforts to achieve cost
containment.
A partial solution to the problem of nonparticipation lies in creat-
ing tax-funded special purpose programs.97 For example, special
funds could be established to compensate providers for services to
those who have failed to obtain health insurance or who are ineligible
for it, such as illegal immigrants. Children and other vulnerable per-
sons could be automatically enrolled in a private health insurance
program and subsidized as required. Or they could be assigned to
risk pools that would be sources of funding for care they need.
If it became apparent over time that significant numbers of per-
sons were not acquiring health insurance on a voluntary basis, new
96 See Carl J. Schramm, Health Care Financingfor All Americans, 265 JAMA 3296, 3297
(1991) (advocating targeted insurance reforms, including reinsurance to absorb losses for
high-risk individuals and high-risk employer groups, state risk pools for high-risk individu-
als who cannot obtain coverage through employers, and expanded Medicaid to cover poor
and near poor).
97 See id. at 3298.
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legislation could require all persons to obtain coverage through their
employers, purchasing cooperatives, or available public programs.
Unless penalties for ignoring this individual mandate were substantial,
a few persons might still forego coverage, as in the case of those who
operate cars without auto liability insurance. Anticipating this possi-
bility, an assessment based or tax-funded uncompensated care fund
could be created to assure that providers receive minimally adequate
payment for services to the uninsured.
A touchy question is whether deferring imposition of an individ-
ual mandate to purchase insurance that is assuredly available is wise
legislative or social policy. It is uncertain how many persons would
actually opt out of coverage. Undoubtedly some would, including
younger persons who see no immediate need for health insurance but
whose participation is needed to assure that health insurers' risk pools
are not disproportionally populated by older and unhealthy persons.
On the other hand, awareness of the high costs of medical care and
the potentially disastrous financial consequences of not having health
insurance seems to be growing. It is thus quite possible that assurance
of access to insurance will attract enough good insurance risks into
the pool that the overall impact of dropouts will be small.
2. Scope of Benefits
Once access to coverage is assured, the question becomes access
to what? Here considerations of cost are pivotal. The cheapest cover-
age would presumably be that which reimburses only for catastrophic
illness or injury, or for costs of treatment that exceed a specified mon-
etary threshold.
At the other pole is comprehensive coverage of all medically nec-
essary expenses, comparable to the defined benefit package of the
HSA, but without deductibles or copayments. It is obvious that a plan
which promises this sort of coverage to everyone would require sub-
stantial tax increases, regardless of any savings from enhanced admin-
istrative efficiencies, vigorous attack on fraud and abuse, and medical
malpractice reforms. If tax increases are unacceptable, options in-
clude limiting the range of benefits, creating disincentives to use serv-
ices (such as higher copayments), and limiting payments to providers
directly through fee scales or indirectly through caps on health insur-
ance premiums.
The political volatility of these alternatives is significant. The
public would presumably prefer broad coverage, little or no coinsur-
ance, and no tax increases. 98 Providers would vigorously oppose re-
ductions in the price of their goods and services and, like most of the
98 See Blendon et al., supra notes 76-77.
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public, would probably disfavor significant tax increases. Thus, an im-
portant challenge is to design a benefit package that would not in-
crease taxes so much as to invite public rejection but that somehow
meets public expectations for health care of decent quality and prov-
iders' expectations for decent incomes.
In constructing such a core benefits package, reliable projections
of budgetary consequences of particular options are essential. These
are hard to come by, and legislators may feel a need to fall back on
some organizing principle to guide their deliberations.
Professor Dworkin has offered one such principle, that of "pru-
dent insurance."99 Applying this principle involves determining what
health insurance coverage prudent persons would buy in a truly free
market if they had state-of-the-art information about costs and bene-
fits of medical services for which they can anticipate a need. Dworkin
suggests that legislators could make such determinations after hearing
the views of citizens and the opinions of experts skilled in evaluating
the utility of particular health services. This determination would
then become the core or basic benefit package to which all would
have access through their health insurance. If the resulting package
seemed too expensive, legislators could pare it by trying to assess what
benefits a prudent but financially strapped person would choose to
forego.
Without such an organizing principle, those who construct a core
benefit package may be left with a choice between covering general
categories of "medically necessary" services such as office visits, hospi-
talization, diagnostic tests, and drugs, or trying to specify what medical
conditions qualify for coverage. The first choice is simpler concep-
tually but leaves an opportunity for interminable hassling over
whether particular items of care are "medically necessary." The sec-
ond would engage legislators in a lengthy, complex task of cost-bene-
fit analysis,' 00 requiring considerable input from medical and
scientific experts, and could result in extremely prolix laws or
regulations.
Although applying a "prudent insurance" test in developing a
core benefit package would not eliminate all problems inherent in
either of these options, it would force legislators to look at health in-
surance in the context of the totality of social needs and to recognize
that health care is but one of several goods the public may desire.
99 Ronald Dworkin, Will Clinton's Plan Be Fair?, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Jan. 18, 1994, at 20,
22.
100 See W.John Thomas, The Oregon Medicaid Proposak EthicalParalysis, Tragic Democraty,
and the Fate of a Utilitarian Health Care Program, 72 Op. L. REv. 47, 91-104 (1993) (depicting
complex nature of prioritizing by need for health services).
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This might help legislators resist a tendency toward fiscally unsustain-
able overinclusiveness in the core benefit package.
3. Permanency of Coverage
Minimally adequate health care reform requires that all persons
be allowed to keep their health insurance, whether or not they are in
good health. A striking shortcoming in the current system of health
insurance is insecurity of coverage. Insurers often cancel or limit cov-
erage if individual subscribers incur large medical expenses or are
thought to represent high risks. Workers who lose theirjobs also lose
employment-based health insurance or, if continuation coverage is -of-
fered, may not be able to afford it. Moreover, a new health insurer
may refuse coverage for health problems that developed while cov-
ered under the worker's former insurance on the ground they repre-
sent preexisting conditions.
Under a reform that assures access to health insurance coverage
for all, an applicant's preexisting condition cannot bar coverage.
Consequently, health insurers will have higher costs and will need to
adjust their premiums. Traditionally, their approach has been to em-
ploy some form of experience rating so that individuals or groups who
represent higher actuarial risks pay higher premiums. Experience rat-
ing can result in very high premiums for some individuals or for small
groups with a disproportionate number of high-risk members, so high
as to be prohibitive in some instances.
An effective-though hardly uncontroversial-response is to re-
quire all insurers to employ community rating of premiums, as under
the HSA. Under community rating, all subscribers in broadly defined
risk pools pay the same premiums, regardless of whether they have
preexisting conditions or are heavy users of medical services. In this
way, relatively healthy subscribers subsidize those whose medical
needs are greater. While they may then be tempted to try to secure
coverage from insurers whose subscriber population generates smaller
cross-subsidies of this nature, the effort should be largely fruitless if
insurers must accept all comers and use community rating in setting
premiums. Moreover, risk-adjustment methodologies could be in-
voked to equalize premiums charged by insurers in particular locales.
To prevent insurers from narrowing risk pools in such a way as to
defeat the goals of community rating, laws could limit risk pools to
broad age categories (for example, under twenty-one years old,
twenty-one to fifty, over fifty) and geographic locale (in recognition of
wide regional variations in health care costs).
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4. Financing and Cost Containment
Expanding the number of covered persons and ensuring their
entitlement to specified core benefits will obviously raise total health
care expenditures. The approach outlined above would probably re-
quire a mix of tax increases, shifting of costs to those with greater
ability to pay, and lower profits for some health insurers and medical
providers.
a. Market Efficiencies
The magnitude of these effects would be influenced by the de-
gree of efficiency that insurers and providers achieve in the operation
of their enterprises. Highly efficient insurers and providers may not
only improve their own profitability but could also keep health care
costs at levels that dampen the need for substantial tax increases.
Conversely, widespread inefficiencies would reduce profit margins
and possibly fuel higher taxes.
Market-based competition is intended to maximize efficiency, re-
ducing the need for frankly regulatory solutions such as premium
caps, provider fee scales, hospital rate regulation, and restraints on
capital expenditures for new facilities and technologies. Insurers that
are truly competing with one another have a powerful incentive to
obtain discounted prices from providers, and providers have incentive
to contract with insurers who can assure them a steady supply of in-
sured patients, while keeping their costs low enough to maximize
profits in the face of discounted prices.
Whether this idealized version of competition in health care will
in fact work is an open question. But the moderation of health care
cost inflation that has emerged in the context of voluntary shifts to-
wards a market-oriented delivery system offers some encouragement.
To me this is enough to warrant foregoing, for now, resort to price
controls or increased regulation of how providers and payors negoti-
ate prices. Some form of global expenditure targets might be appro-
priate as an aspirational goal and as a benchmark for adjusting
benefits, subsidies, and coinsurance requirements. Also helpful would
be vigorous efforts to streamline processing of insurance claims; to
attack fraud, dubious gaming practices, and self-dealing among prov-
iders; and to reduce the more outlandish extravagances of medical
malpractice litigation. 01
101 See RobertJ. Rubin & David A. Mendelson, Estimating the Costs of Defensive Medicine,
10(4) MED. BENEFIrS 7 (1993) (estimating annual costs of defensive medical practices at
$25 billion, representing about 3% of total health care expenditures).
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b. Role of Employers
Despite the linkage between employment and health insurance
and the fact that many employers currently pay for their employees'
health insurance, a market-based approach does not logically require
that employers pay. Many employers may merely act as agents for
their employees to obtain coverage at favorable group rates. It is in
this role that employers can make the greatest contribution to cost
containment. Indeed, the most useful form of an employer mandate
might be one that requires employers, particularly large ones, to act as
bargaining agents for their employees in the purchase of health insur-
ance, whether or not employers pay the bill.
If employers pay some or all of their employees' health insurance
bills, so much the better for the employees. But if employers do not
pay, employees are in no worse position than the self-employed. Both
could use voluntary purchasing cooperatives to secure coverage that is
discounted, permanent, and affords the required core benefits.
c. Income Tax Considerations
Where employers pay for employees' health insurance, the value
of this benefit ought to be includible in the taxable income of employ-
ees. It is clearly part of the employees' compensation and should be
treated as such. Moreover, taxing the value of health benefits would
give employees a stake in trying to hold down insurance costs.
One great advantage of taxing employee health benefits is the
billions of dollars this would yield the federal government to subsidize
health insurance for those who cannot afford it.102 Removal of the tax
preference might also encourage some employees to seek cash pay-
ments, in lieu of health benefits, to purchase health insurance from a
more satisfactory insurer.
If this change in income tax laws proves politically impossible, as
it might, one could limit the exclusion from taxable income to the
imputed value of the core health benefits, or deny a deduction to em-
ployers for payments to purchase extra benefits for employees. This
would yield extra tax revenues and might discourage employers and
employees from collaborating in overuse of medical services. Alterna-
tively, employers could be subject to a tax with respect to payments
made to purchase extra benefits for their employees. In this scenario,
employees could continue to receive tax-free health benefits, but em-
ployers might be less generous in what they offer.
102 See Marquis & Buchanan, supra note 80.
1994] 1429
HeinOnline -- 79 Cornell L. Rev. 1429 1993-1994
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
d. Physician Workforce Reform
Because of the great difficulty in accurately predicting how many
physicians or specialists are needed to make the medical marketplace
work,'0 3 the foundation for regulatory control of the supply of physi-
cians or their choice of specialty is shaky. Moreover, reliance on mar-
ket forces as a dominant strategy of cost containment would seem to
count against attempts to regulate the supply of physicians.
Although medical specialists may indeed contribute to spiraling
costs of health care, cost-conscious and competitive health plans
ought to be able to influence physicians who overutilize medical re-
sources by limiting referrals to them and denying payment for inap-
propriate services. Eventually specialists who face competition would
be expected either to lower their prices or to decrease the volume of
unnecessary or marginal services they provide. Moreover, the degree
of competition in various specialties should ultimately influence entry.
Thus, if the average income of physicians in currently overpopulated
specialties such as ophthalmology or orthopedics begins to decline,
the flow of new physicians may shift towards nonspecialty practice or
into specialties where the demand for new entrants is greater.
However, eschewing formal workforce controls does not mean ig-
noring the issue of whether "too many" specialists are being trained.
Through the existing Medicare subsidy for graduate medical educa-
tion and the proposed HSA subsidy, clinical training of medical grad-
uates would continue to enjoy federal support. Most of the trainees
are now in specialty programs, 10 4 and the federal subsidy is equivalent
to an entitlement program costing taxpayers several billion dollars a
year. To qualify for the subsidy, an academic medical center need
only secure approval of its training program by a private accrediting
body that assesses whether the program meets prescribed educational
standards.' 0 5 The accreditation process does not explicitly address
the need for physicians in a specialty or take into account that other
programs in that specialty may already be turning out substantial
numbers of new trainees. Furthermore, hospitals may opt to engage
in specialty training for very parochial reasons, such as a desire for the
cheap labor represented by trainees or the desire to market them-
selves as a "teaching hospital."
103 See Feil et al., supra note 90.
104 See David A. Kindig & Donald Libby, How Will Graduate Medical Education Reform
Affect Specialties and Geographic Areas?, 272 JAMA 37, 39 (1994) (current data indicate that
the majority of medical residents now in training will enter specialties); Jack M. Colwill,
Where Have All the Primary Care Applicants Gone?, 326 NEw ENG.J. MED. 387, 388-89 (1992)
(describing recent sharp decline in applications for residencies in primary care).
105 See Schwartz et al., supra note 87, at 1079 (describing how current system of accred-
iting graduate medical education programs allows academic medical centers to ignore na-
tional health needs for more generalists).
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Even if academic medical centers have not captured the accredit-
ing process, there is reason to believe they are training more of some
specialists than can be absorbed by the current medical marketplace
in those specialties.' 0 6 This suggests a need for a more socially respon-
sive accrediting process, one that takes into account that large
amounts of public funds are expended as a result of accrediting deci-
sions. In short, rather than trying to allocate training slots by regula-
tion, a more cogent reform might be to require academic medical
centers to inform themselves about societal needs for specialty services
and recast their training efforts accordingly.
5. Considerations of Federalism
a. A Federal Law
Under the version of minimally adequate health care reform
sketched out in preceding sections, I envision that Congress would
enact federal legislation requiring that all interstate health insurers
offer insurance policies to all comers, regardless of health status. The
law would also specify a core benefit package based on a "prudent
insurance" principle, or at least establish a mechanism by which the
package could be defined and adjusted. The law would require that
insurers utilize community rating in calculating premiums for the
core benefits, adjusting only for age and geographic locale of sub-
scribers, and would forbid cancellation of policies except for nonpay-
ment of premiums or fraud.
The law would also include a methodology for subsidizing per-
sons unable to pay for insurance but would not require employers to
pay for their employees' insurance. It would remove the tax prefer-
ence for employee health benefits to free up funds for subsidies and
provide incentives to encourage states to form voluntary purchasing
cooperatives or alliances for use by persons who are unemployed or
needy, or whose employers have opted not to buy them health
insurance.
b. Role of States
Under this hypothesized federal law, states would retain their
powers under the McCarran-Ferguson Act'0 7 to regulate health insur-
ers in ways not inconsistent with the new federal law. States could
thus set capital requirements and other standards relating to solvency
and claims administration. They could monitor insurers to assure
compliance with the federal mandate to employ community rating in
106 See Marc L. Rivo & David Satcher, Improving Access to Health Care Through Physician
Workplace Reform, 270JAMA 1074 (1993).
107 McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1988)).
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setting premiums and with the statutory bar against cancellation of
policies other than for nonpayment of premiums or fraud. States
would also retain existing powers to regulate health plans and provid-
ers with respect to credentialing and quality of care, to conduct inno-
vative health planning, to regulate supplemental health insurance for
excess coverage beyond the core benefit package, and to enforce their
own antitrust laws.
This distribution of power among federal and state governments
would minimize the need for a new federal bureaucracy, although it
would not eliminate the need for a federal role in formulating and
adjusting the core benefit package and administering a subsidy pro-
gram. States, however, could largely administer a subsidy program
once basic eligibility criteria were established under federal law, and
could also provide more generous subsidies than under federal law if
they so chose. Existing federal antitrust laws would remain in place to
protect the health care marketplace against anticompetitive conduct
by health insurers, provider networks, or other groups that have
gained market power.
The hypothesized federal legislation would effectively remove the
temptation for employers to self-insure their employee health benefit
programs only so they could hide behind ERISA.108 ERISA preemp-
tion of state regulation has been exploited by some employers to es-
cape state insurance laws mandating benefits or limiting insurers'
freedom to restrict coverage for preexisting conditions or illnesses
deemed too costly to insure. 10 9 Employees under the new regime
would be entitled to obtain coverage for core benefits and protection
against cancellations, whether or not employers chose to pay for the
coverage. In this context, the ERISA preemption clause would have
little significance. The new federal law would itself enable access to
specified core benefits and durable coverage for everyone.
CONCLUSION
The complex and ambitious HSA aims for universal coverage and
cost containment in health care. To these ends, it would reconfigure
the medical marketplace through regulation that includes mandatory
purchase of private health insurance, a requirement that employers
pay the costs of insuring employees and their families, and standby
price controls in the form of premium caps. Its financing relies on
108 Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
109 See generally Wendy K. Mariner, Problms With Employer-Provided Health Insurance-The
Employee Retirement Income Security Act and Health Care Reform, 327 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1682
(1992) (noting how ERISA preempts states from imposing their own substantive standards
for employee health benefits upon self-insuring employers while providing no such stan-
dards of its own).
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improved efficiencies in a regulated market, targeted taxes, controls
on the supply and distribution of physicians, administrative savings,
malpractice liability reforms, and stronger enforcement of expanded
fraud and abuse laws.
Success in meeting its goals would likely require conjunction of a
high level of bureaucratic competence, compliant providers and in-
surers, and a public that is willing to share the undoubtedly high costs
of the plan. That this blend of conditions now exists or is soon attain-
able is doubtful.
In my view, moreover, the plan is seriously flawed. It is broadly
coercive and its declared commitment to a competitive market is in
many respects illusory. The competitive structure it contemplates
seems overly contrived, its emphasis on employer financing obfuscates
the true costs of the plan, it retains perverse tax incentives, it proposes
regulation of the supply of physicians without adequate foundation,
and its potentially adverse impact on medical professionalism may dis-
advantage patients.
Based on a belief that significant health care reform is nonethe-
less highly desirable, I have sketched a less intrusive path to expanded
coverage. It features guaranteed access to noncancellable health in-
surance, a benefit package incorporating the "prudent insurance"
principle of Dworkin, modified community rating of premiums, pub-
lic subsidies for those of limited means, elimination of some tax bene-
fits, a restrained approach to regulating the physician workforce, and
a commitment to preserving an important role for state governments
in overseeing delivery of care. While there are many pitfalls in this
approach, I believe it offers a useful way of redressing major problems
of American health care at a more tolerable social cost than the HSA
or its variants would impose.
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